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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESSIVE JACKPOTS: 
A BETTER ANALYSIS 
To the Editor: 
The timing of deductions associated with progressive 
slot machines is an issue that obviously won't disappear, 
although worrying about casino taxation may be a pe-
culiar way for bright people to spend their time. Lee 
Sheppard's news analysis on this issue (see Tax Notes, 
October 9, 1989, p. 160) is delightful, and I agree with her 
ultimate conclusion: in the best of all possible worlds, a 
casino should not be able to deduct amounts associated 
with progressive jackpots until they are paid out. But Ms. 
Sheppard purports to analyze section 461 (h), not the 
ideal world, and she is on shaky ground in her statutory 
analysis. 
~ Ms. Sheppard is also too quick to reject a 
perfectly plausible argument Interpreting ob-
scure statutory language. 
• 
Several years ago in this journal (see Tax Notes, Sep-
tember 1, 1986, p. 911) I concluded that, had section 
461 (h) been in effect for the tax years involved, it would 
have changed the result in United States v. Hughes 
Properties, 476 U.S. 593 (1986). I came to regret that 
position, not because I thought it was necessarily wrong, 
but because I had given insufficient weight to the argu-
ment that economic performance occurs as gamblers 
play the machines, rather than when the jackpots are 
paid.' I think that Ms. Sheppard is also too quick to reject 
a perfectly plausible argument interpreting obscure statu-
tory language. 
Here's how the argument runs. Hughes Properties tells 
us that the all events test is met at the end of the casino's 
taxable year (assuminf! the amount of the liability can 
then be determined). Had there been no statutory change, 
casinos could therefore have deducted each year's in-
crease in the aggregate progressive jackpot liabilities. 
However, section 461 (h), added to the Code in 1984, 
attached a further requirement: a liability meeting the all 
events test can be deducted no earlier than the time of 
economic performance. What constitutes economic per-
formance in the case of progressive jackpots? 
'I pulled back a bit from my initial position in "The Supreme 
Court and the Timing of Deductions for Accrual-Basis Tax-
payers," 22 Ga. L. Rev. 229,255 n. 119 (1988). 
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Section 461 (h)(2) lists a number of ways in which 
economic performance is deemed to occur, and somehow 
or other we need to fit the casino situation into statutory 
language not designed to it. Ms. Sheppard does not tell 
us how she concludes under the statute what economic 
performance is. Ms. Sheppard uses the word "clearly" 
often in her analysis, but the conclusion that economic 
performance occurs upon payment of the jackpot is not 
at all clear. Ms. Sheppard notes that "taxpayers cannot 
write their own exceptions"; similarly, she cannot write 
her own statute. In most cases under section 461 (h)(2), 
economic performance is not payment, but some other 
event or series of events. 
What else could economic performance be? Section 
461 (h)(2)(B) states that, in the case of services and prop-
erty provided by the taxpayer, "economic performance 
occurs as the taxpayer provides such property or ser-
vices." One of Ms. Sheppard's interviewees asked, "What 
does entertainment have to do with timing of deductions?" 
The answer to that question is obvious-under the stat-
ute. If providing entertainment constitutes the provision 
of services and gamblers are entertained· by merely 
playing slot machines provided by a casino, economic 
performance occurs as the machines are played. That 
analysis is not mandated by the statutory language-
there are a lot of its involved-but neither is it an off-the-
wall argument. For better or for worse, statutes do not 
always lead to the conceptually best results. 
Ms. Sheppard uses the recurring items exception of 
section 461 (h)(3) to bolster her case that economic 
performance occurs at the time of payment, but her 
presentation is misleading at best. That exception permits 
treating a liability associated with certain "recurring 
items" as incurred in a particular taxable year even 
though economic performance has not yet occurred. For 
the exception to apply, a number of tests must be met, 
including a requirement that economic performance in 
fact occurs within the shorter of a reasonable period or 
8.5 months after the close of the taxable year. Ms. 
Sheppard concludes that "there is a reason for the 8.5 
month rule. Congress clearly [that word again!] did not 
want deductions accelerated more than that limit." 
Saying something is clear doesn't make it so. If Con-
gress had wanted Ms. Sheppard's "8.5 month rule," it 
could have written the rule into the basic definition of 
economk performance, rather than into an exception-
an exception that comes into play only when the eco-
nomic performance requirement has not otherwise been 
met. Indeed, for nonrecurring items, it is conceivable 
that, even with section 461 (h) on the books, deductions 
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can be accelerated far beyond 8.5 months (e.g., if th~ all 
events test and economic performance are met long 
before the taxpayer must make payment on the liability). 
Ms: Sileppard's recurring items ariaiysis is flawed be-
cause it assumes its conclusion. She is right that "not all 
casino operators caw guarantee that the· progressive 
jackpots will be paid within 8.5 months after the close of 
the taxable year in which they would be deducted," but 
that fact is important only if payment constitutes eco-
nomic performance. If economic performance occurs as 
the machines are played, we have no reason to be 
concerned about the recurring items exception. 
When doubt remains about the time Qf eco-
nomic performance after legitimate attempts 
have been made to apply those definitions,. the 
deduction should be deferred until paymeni. 
One passage in Ms. Sheppard's analysis can be inter-
preted to mean that "recurring items," as that term would 
be understood iri a common sense way, must always be 
examined under section 461 (h)(3). I'm not sure she 
meant to say that. In any case; it's not true. Many 
"recurring items" easily meet one of the definitions of 
economic performance in section 461 (h)(2), without re-
gard to the recurring items exception, and that is the 
argument of the casino lawyers and accountants. 
None of this is to say that Ms. Sheppard's result is 
wrong, only that the issue is· not nearly so clear as she 
makes it out to be. (An aside: Is this clearly a s13ction 
461 (h) issue? Maybe we should be considering timing-of-
income principles rather than those governing timing of 
deductions.) I prefer an analysis as follows: The progres-
sive jackpot situation does not fit easily within any of the 
statutory definitions of economic performance. When 
doubt remains ?bout th~ttime of economic performance 
after legitimate attempts.have been made to apply those 
definitions, the deduction should be deferred until pay-
ment. in other words, when in doubt; defer. That govern-
ing principle has several virtues, including its closer 
relationship to the language of section 461 (h) than any-
thing in Ms. Sheppard's analysis. 
Very truly yours, 
Erik M. Jensen 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve 
University 
Cleveland, Ohio 
October 12, 1989 
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To the Editor: 
I was deeply inspired by the letter to an unidentified 
senator by Mr. Ike N. O'Ciast that explainedwhy a capital 
gains cut is good for the country. (See Tax Notes, Octo-
ber 9, 1989, p. 244.) Indeed, I was so. inspired that I 
wanted to add my own, of course humble, contribution. 
(One cannot but be humble in the face of such preceding 
eloquence.) _ . 
In my view, the House bill lowering the capital gains 
rate for two years was a brilliant piece of legislation that 
has taken a lot of unfair criticism. It should have a place 
in our hearts for years to come whether or not it passes. 
Unfortunately, people simply don't seem to understand 
its massively positive effects on efficiency. 
As we learned in 1986, differential tax rates are ineffi-
cient. But given the short-term nature of the rate reduction 
in the House bill, it is unlikely to harm efficiency. Two 
years is simply too short a period for people to plan on 
capital gains from new investments. Thus, the provision 
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is simply a windfall to a handful of lucky taxpayers, 
without negative efficiency consequences. This, in turn, 
is wonderful for the most important type of efficiency: 
efficient fund-raising by members of Congress who realize 
that their constituents are too lazy or ungrateful to make 
appropriate campaign contributions in the absence of tax 
incentives. 
Moreover, the House bill maximizes revenue-raising 
efficiency. It is widely believed that changing the capital 
gains rate raises revenue whether the rate goes up or 
down. When the rate goes down, pent-up demand is 
released. When the rate goes up, the increase is preceded 
by a rush to market. 
The House bill is wonderful in that it both lowers and 
raises the rate. But it is here, alas, that the bill does not go 
quite far enough. The ideal proposal would be one in 
which rates were raised and lowered again and again. For 
example, Congress could establish a capital gains rate 
lottery. Every two years, a new capital gains rate would 
be picked by random drawing. The rate could be any 
integer between, say, five and fifty percent (although 
there is admittedly a certain elegance to picking non-
integers such as 19.6 percent). The new rate would be 
effective six months after it was announced, giving plenty 
of time for the rush .to market in the event of a rate 
increase. 
I estimate that this proposal would raise literally billions 
of tax dollars. On the other hand, perhaps it is not that far 
from the system we already have. 
Mack A. Damia 
Honolulu, Hawaii 
October 16, 1989 
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